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Europe is struggling in the face of the pandemic. Germany in particular 
fails to recognise the historic proportions of this undertaking, and has re-
duced itself to the role of the model student who cannot help but lecture 
others along the way.
Europe is not a dictatorship. Europe is not even a state. Europe is a multi-
layered political system with overlapping structures of legitimation, 
interspersed with national borders. We are all too happy to whitewash 
it in the good times as a Schicksalsgemeinschaft, or ‘community of 
common destiny’, only to rediscover in the bad times how thin and 
flaky that whitewash really is. Accordingly, the European Union finds it 
difficult to take firm decisions under pressure. But in a crisis like the one 
we face today, that cannot be an excuse.
In many places on our continent, anger is growing at the European 
response to the pandemic. But this resistance is not directed against 
an illegitimate or misguided exercise of power, as it is elsewhere in the 
world. The anger of many Europeans in this crisis is directed against a 
different extreme: against a lack of political leadership, and of clarity 
and solidarity; against the failure to use the strength of our political 
unity to do good, and to prevent the worst.
Europe will emerge weakened from this crisis, as technical discussions 
once again eclipse politics. For experts, the package approved on 
Thursday by the Eurogroup may be quite acceptable, but the underlying 
political message remains fatal: Europe‘s corona crisis policy up to now 
is nothing more than a continuation of the old euro crisis policy, driven 
by technocratic thinking and mistrust. Technocracy, however, is the 
enemy of clear political signalling, and mistrust is the greatest enemy of 
political integration. Europe is negotiating itself into its own irrelevance.
It is a cruel irony of history that Italy and Spain, the two largest euro 
crisis countries, were both the first and the most brutally affected by the 
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pandemic. But instead of compassion, Pavlovian conditioning has taken hold. Long-
term solidarity with Italy? The question appears to be the same in the new crisis as 
in the old one. And because it has been a guiding principle of Germany’s EU policy 
in the past decade to prevent the ultimate opening of the floodgates that common 
debt would represent, the old euro crisis script is suddenly back in play: liability and 
control must come together. In Germany, few have noticed the cynicism behind the 
use of these terms, which emerged in the euro crisis with respect to struggling loans 
in Italian banks, to refer to struggling patients in Italian hospitals. In Italy, on the 
other hand, many are feeling the ill-fitting coldness of the fiscal policy formulas.
In this respect, it also doesn‘t help that even the German Chancellor spoke at the 
beginning of this week of a ‘symmetrical shock’, in order to signal that the pandemic 
is equally affecting all Member States. Angela Merkel’s assessment is correct – but 
where are the consequences?
From an economic policy perspective, a symmetrical shock must be followed by a 
symmetrical response, a real European response – whether through Eurobonds, the 
EU budget, or a jointly guaranteed rescue package. Of course, the technical design of 
these instruments is important. But the negotiation becomes politically dangerous 
when it gives the impression that in the end, it is all about the concepts of control 
and liability, and dodges any true solidarity. In order to find a solution commensurate 
with the pandemic shock, two factors would have been needed: clear leadership at 
the European level, and a clear commitment by Germany to first think European, not 
nationally. Germany could have done this. Yet it did not.
And why should it have? Germany has had exceptional luck in this crisis: a delayed 
outbreak of the pandemic allowed us to react early. Senior citizens were warned by 
the images coming out of Italy, and were able to self-isolate at the right time. The low 
death rate in Germany up to this point wouldn’t have been possible without smart 
crisis policies – but it also had a lot to do with luck. Unfortunately, Germany has not 
understood its good fortune as such and therefore has not used it as an opportunity 
to display real European solidarity. 
Instead, many in our country have taken the position of the model student in fiscal 
and health policy. We are well-organised and have prudently managed our economy, 
and that’s why we have enough intensive care beds. We are well-organised and have 
prudently managed our economy, and that’s why we can afford to pull out the ‘big 
bazooka’ in our crisis response. We are well-organised and have prudently managed 
our economy – and that’s exactly why we must not carelessly jeopardise the rules of 
good organisation and prudent economic management. 
In large parts of Europe, however, Germany is not seen as the model student in 
economics. Other countries take a more disrespectful perspective towards the 
presumed over-achiever. Isn‘t the success of the German economy in the past decade 
primarily due to its current account surpluses? Wasn‘t Germany the driver behind 
the austerity mantra in the currency union? Didn‘t Germany profit at the expense of 
other countries during the crisis? 
Distorted images of this kind don’t do justice to Germany‘s role in the past decade. 
But it is true that we have to ask ourselves whether it would have been better for 
European cohesion if the euro crisis policy had been less strict and if Germany had 
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invested more in its own country. The mistrust from the other Europeans has not come 
out of nowhere. It’s a thin line between export strength and beggar thy neighbor. And 
Germany has never made a serious attempt to complement its de facto dominance in 
European economic policy with the associated solidarity. 
Hegemony is traditionally based in either coercion or benevolence. Germany may 
have implicitly claimed the role as Europe’s economic hegemon during and after 
the euro crisis and in the following years, but has always explicitly denied it at the 
same time. The coercion factor, which Berlin always tactically redirected via Brussels 
and the framework of European treaties and regulations, was accordingly diffuse. 
Similarly diffuse was also the benevolence factor, which was not entirely absent, 
and which Berlin – tactically also wise – redirected via Frankfurt and the expansive 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank or via loans from the European Stability 
Mechanism. What stuck was the image of the solidarity-lacking Germans and their 
religion of Ordnungspolitik.
In the fall of 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron gave Germany the opportu-
nity to rethink its own role and make a positive contribution to the further develop-
ment of Europe with his Sorbonne speech. We know what the outcome has been. 
The corona crisis has given Germany a second chance to come back to a wise, success-
ful long-term EU policy. Germany had the opportunity to take on a more nuanced 
political position. Germany’s firm, sometimes described as ‘hard’, positioning in the 
euro-crisis could have even received an additional air of legitimacy if we had shown 
empathy now. Empathy may not be a classical category of European economic policy, 
but that’s exactly the point. This is not an economic policy crisis, but a societal break-
down.
Granted: the other countries haven’t made it easy for us. As correct as corona bonds 
would be, morally elevating a fiscal policy instrument as the only true answer to a 
societal breakdown is not helpful. Bonds will not save Europe. They do not answer 
the central political questions of what exactly will be financed, who decides on the 
expenditures, and what actual transfers are involved. Bonds don‘t work without 
politics. It was foreseeable that a debate fixated on corona bonds would result in 
exactly the kind of technocratic compromise which is not economically wrong, but 
which conveys a political coldness. We should have learned from the euro crisis that 
a technocratic, apolitical Europe promotes its own disintegration.
Only one European institution currently offers some form of orientation – the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), which has in fact succeeded in formulating a clear answer 
within its tightly restricted mandate. In this respect, the political independence of 
the ECB is both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. It can do what is right, 
beyond any form of political pressure. But for exactly that reason, it is constantly un-
der criticism.
In this crisis, the Bundesbank and its President Jens Weidmann deserve great respect; 
perceiving the true scope of the crisis, they have silently acquiesced to the ECB res-
ponse, which they probably would have strongly combated just a few months ago. 
Why isn’t such consideration for what is truly important, this breaking free from old 
reflexes, also possible in other policy areas?
The economic consequences of a botched crisis response in Europe would be massi-
4/4
Online: delorscentre.eu
E-Mail: info@delorscentre.eu
Twitter: @delorsberlin
Friedrichstraße 194
D – 10117 Berlin
Tel.:  +49 (0)30/259 219 107
Hertie School gGmbH • Chairman of the Supervisory Board: Bernd Knobloch • Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees: Frank Mattern • Academic Director: Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein • Managing Director: Dr. Axel Baisch • 
Registered Office: Berlin • Trade Register: Local Court, Berlin-Charlottenburg HRB 97018 B •
Hertie School – founded and supported by the non-profit Hertie Foundation
ve. Many clever texts on the economic policy necessity of Eurobonds have described 
them in detail. But the political consequences would be far greater. Italy is already 
the member of the European Union with the lowest level of trust into the European 
Union. Whoever is left alone in their darkest moment will not forget it.
With the lethargic hyper-pragmatism of the euro crisis years, Europe will not be able 
to defeat the pandemic nor shape the economic reconstruction. Not to even mention 
dealing with other pressing questions, such as the situation of refugees on the Greek 
islands, the response to the autocratic excesses in countries such as Hungary or 
Poland, climate change, or Europe‘s security policy positioning in the world.
This continent looks back at a long history of battles against an excess of political 
authority. Today it is more important than ever to demand political leadership. As 
Europe is not a dictatorship, let alone a state, the way forward must be through the 
Member States.
This battle is difficult. But it is a battle worth fighting. Germany must now take 
responsibility. Anything else would be a failure of historical proportion.
